Once again this topic rears its head… But two interesting connections have occurred to me based on some recent reading of Aristotle
. I have to say on the front end that this is not a topic that Aristotle ever consciously discussed- the debate over the nature of freedom post-dates Aristotle, believe it or not. That said, I am trying to avoid being anachronistic. My claim here is not that Aristotle argued for a particular model of freedom but that some aspects of Aristotle's thought can be useful to explaining a later idea of freedom as espoused by more existentialist thinkers.
. I have to say on the front end that this is not a topic that Aristotle ever consciously discussed- the debate over the nature of freedom post-dates Aristotle, believe it or not. That said, I am trying to avoid being anachronistic. My claim here is not that Aristotle argued for a particular model of freedom but that some aspects of Aristotle's thought can be useful to explaining a later idea of freedom as espoused by more existentialist thinkers.The first idea is a distinction that Aristotle makes between two parts of human reasoning: the “mathematical” and the “deliberative.” The mathematical follows "necessary" principles to reach its conclusions. The deliberative part is a bit more open-ended, though. Its principles are not "necessary", they are in some sense dependent on the goal of a person's life or existence. They are, in other words, deliberately chosen by the individual as part of the development of that person into their individual self.
The second idea from Aristotle that I think is particularly useful is his notion of chance. For Aristotle "chance" does not imply the kind of randomness we think of perhaps associating with the string of numbers we might get from rolling a twenty-sided die over and over again or the order of a well-shuffled deck of cards. That kind of randomness is not what Aristotle means when he says something happens by chance. Nor does he mean "without cause," which is often what libertarian freedom is accused of implying. What Aristotle does mean by chance, however, might be termed "unintended circumstances." Two causally determined chains of action cross in a way not intended by either. The farmer plowing their field comes across a chest buried there long ago. The chest is not there "randomly"- it was intentionally hidden there. Nor is the farmer there "randomly"- he intended to be plowing his field. But neither the person who hid the chest nor the farmer intended for this discovery to happen, these two paths have crossed in a way that was unexpected, creating an "unintended circumstance."
The model of free will I have found most compelling is one that I think can be greatly aided by both these concepts. This model is one that I think is representative of how many existentialist writers think about free will, and in more analytic thinking something similar is argued for by Robert Kane. Basically, the model argues that not every decision must be "free" in the sense of having "alternative possibilities." Instead, freedom refers to our ability to shape ourselves, to oversee the formation of our character and beliefs. This requires that at crucial junctures in our life, what Kane calls "Self-Forming Moments," we have the ability to choose which way we will go. From Aristotle I think we can construct an account of how this works. These moments arise from the kinds of "unintended circumstances" that we encounter throughout life. In these moments where the chain of action we have taken part in leaves us entirely unprepared for the circumstance we find ourselves in, a decision must be made which will set the course of a new chain of action. That decision is not necessitated by any of the previous actions that brought us to this place- it is a "new" moment, as it were. Thus, we must deliberate and determine what principles will guide us through that moment. It is in exactly these sorts of circumstances that our character is "formed" into the kind of person we are.
. Basically, the model argues that not every decision must be "free" in the sense of having "alternative possibilities." Instead, freedom refers to our ability to shape ourselves, to oversee the formation of our character and beliefs. This requires that at crucial junctures in our life, what Kane calls "Self-Forming Moments," we have the ability to choose which way we will go. From Aristotle I think we can construct an account of how this works. These moments arise from the kinds of "unintended circumstances" that we encounter throughout life. In these moments where the chain of action we have taken part in leaves us entirely unprepared for the circumstance we find ourselves in, a decision must be made which will set the course of a new chain of action. That decision is not necessitated by any of the previous actions that brought us to this place- it is a "new" moment, as it were. Thus, we must deliberate and determine what principles will guide us through that moment. It is in exactly these sorts of circumstances that our character is "formed" into the kind of person we are.
Another, perhaps more effective, response to the grounding objection would be to point out that the objection subtly begs the question for determinism. To see this, let me ask what the relevant difference is between there being "no fact of the matter, or truthfulness" to a proposition and the proposition not existing? My suspicion is that those statements are actually synonymous.
ReplyDeleteLet me play around a little with the wording of the objection- if the objection was worded like this, I think most libertarians would be perfectly fine accepting the proposition:
If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then at any time prior to C it is unknown what S would do in C. Therefore, it is unknown what S would do in C at any time prior to C.
The choice of wording which reads "there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C" in the premise and the link between "fact of the matter" and "truthfulness" and existence in the conclusion says something more than simply a lack of knoweldge. They are describing a kind of existence for the actions of S which does not occur if the actions are not determined. Namely, this is a kind of "fixed existence" in which all actions are known because all actions are determined- what S would do in C is an eternally existing fact. If we start off with this kind of understanding of "facts of the matter" concerning what will be done then of course denying determinism leads to this conclusion. But we have gotten to that conclusion only because we assumed existence can only happen if things are determined and thus all facts are eternally fixed.
When we analyze the objection this way, it doesn't seem to me to be much of an objection at all. This is simply an observation of what is entailed by libertariansm, namely, the denial of determinism. It does not mean, though, that the action S at C could not come into existence at C. In other words, if we modify the premise, as many libertarians might to read "there is no fact of the matter, prior to C, to what S would do in C" then the conclusion does not follow. Or if we adopt a view of existence that does not require things to be eternally fixed facts to exist (in other words, if we are not Platonists), then I'm again not certain that the conclusion follows.
Does that all make sense?
Nick,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comment! Always appreciate these discussions with you.
First, as a note of clarification, I'm not sure why Kane would label Aristotle a compatibalist. As I noted above the free-will debate post-dates Aristotle and the particular model of compatibalism doesn't really come about, I would argue, until the Enlightenment. So I think Kane is making an anachronistic statement if he genuinely thinks Aristotle is a compatibalist. As I have said, I'm not trying to claim Aristotle as a libertarian, I'm trying to use some of his ideas to support libertarianism. Perhaps a compatibalist could do something similar, but that does not make Aristotle a compatibalist.
I think there are two responses that could be given to the grounding objection. The classic response, as you have mentioned, would be agent causation, which I think my characterization of Aristotle could lead into. The basic idea would be that the "agent" (S) is the one who initiates the new causal chain that originates from the "unintended circumstances." This is more or less what I was suggesting in the last paragraph of my post.
First of all, it’s interesting that you would place Aristotle within the thought pattern of libertarianism. For even Robert Kane places him within the camp of compatibilism (See his chapter in Four Views on Free Will, 8). In light of this, I think that the issue of “chance” or as you rightly understood it "unintended circumstances" (“as it refers to our ability to shape ourselves, to oversee the formation of our character and beliefs.”) can benefit the compatibilist as well. The issue is whether the farmer (S) had libertarian or compatibilist freedom. You see how it works? The libertarian (and often the compatibilist) might make a statement similar to your own regarding the issue of unintended circumstances and assume their view of freedom holds true. So I think the issue concerns what S would do in these “self forming moments.” If S’s action (x) is not determined in any set of circumstances (C), then we have no way of knowing, or there is no fact of the matter, or truthfulness, concerning what S would do in C. This is the grounding objection to libertarian freedom.
ReplyDeleteHere it is in argument form. Note that I’m following Cowan’s logic.
First the Libertarian Assumption: Given any set of C, S is free to do x in C if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C.
Next the Grounding Objection: If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C.
Therefore: If there is no fact of the matter, or truthfulness, concerning what S would do in C, if S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then it does not exist.
To explain the last part a little more: it does not exist because no knows or there is no truthfulness or fact in the matter.
Now you could respond with agent causation and we can talk about its critique later.
Nick,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comment! Always appreciate these discussions with you.
First, as a note of clarification, I'm not sure why Kane would label Aristotle a compatibalist. As I noted above the free-will debate post-dates Aristotle and the particular model of compatibalism doesn't really come about, I would argue, until the Enlightenment. So I think Kane is making an anachronistic statement if he genuinely thinks Aristotle is a compatibalist. As I have said, I'm not trying to claim Aristotle as a libertarian, I'm trying to use some of his ideas to support libertarianism. Perhaps a compatibalist could do something similar, but that does not make Aristotle a compatibalist.
I think there are two responses that could be given to the grounding objection. The classic response, as you have mentioned, would be agent causation, which I think my characterization of Aristotle could lead into. The basic idea would be that the "agent" (S) is the one who initiates the new causal chain that originates from the "unintended circumstances." This is more or less what I was suggesting in the last paragraph of my post.
Another, perhaps more effective, response to the grounding objection would be to point out that the objection subtly begs the question for determinism. To see this, let me ask what the relevant difference is between there being "no fact of the matter, or truthfulness" to a proposition and the proposition not existing? My suspicion is that those statements are actually synonymous.
ReplyDeleteLet me play around a little with the wording of the objection- if the objection was worded like this, I think most libertarians would be perfectly fine accepting the proposition:
If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then at any time prior to C it is unknown what S would do in C. Therefore, it is unknown what S would do in C at any time prior to C.
The choice of wording which reads "there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C" in the premise and the link between "fact of the matter" and "truthfulness" and existence in the conclusion says something more than simply a lack of knoweldge. They are describing a kind of existence for the actions of S which does not occur if the actions are not determined. Namely, this is a kind of "fixed existence" in which all actions are known because all actions are determined- what S would do in C is an eternally existing fact. If we start off with this kind of understanding of "facts of the matter" concerning what will be done then of course denying determinism leads to this conclusion. But we have gotten to that conclusion only because we assumed existence can only happen if things are determined and thus all facts are eternally fixed.
When we analyze the objection this way, it doesn't seem to me to be much of an objection at all. This is simply an observation of what is entailed by libertariansm, namely, the denial of determinism. It does not mean, though, that the action S at C could not come into existence at C. In other words, if we modify the premise, as many libertarians might to read "there is no fact of the matter, prior to C, to what S would do in C" then the conclusion does not follow. Or if we adopt a view of existence that does not require things to be eternally fixed facts to exist (in other words, if we are not Platonists), then I'm again not certain that the conclusion follows.
Does that all make sense?
Alex,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your clarification concerning your thoughts about Aristotle on this issue. Quickly, many libertarians and compatibilists alike date this debate much earlier than you have, but I’ll shelve that for now.
Next, your observation concerning the grounding objection assuming determinism is noteworthy. However, it would be a bit misleading to state that libertarianism does not also assume a form of determinism (self-determinism). Following your logic, your premises and conclusion are begging the question concerning the legitimacy of agent causation: S and S alone determines either x or ~x. Therefore, the grounding objection does not simply assume determinism insomuch as it uses it, since it is needed for there to be “fact of the matter” regarding what S would do in C.
Given this clarification, it now seems that your distinction between “prior to” C or “in” C is unwarranted. Again the point of the grounding objection is that without determinism you have no fact of the matter concerning S doing either x or ~x, and therefore it does not matter whether determinism was “prior to” C or “in” C. Moreover, these notions of “fixed existence” do not pertain to this discussion, since both systems of freedom claim determinism at one point or another. Therefore, the question is the legitimacy of each one, and it’s my contentions that agent causation just doesn’t cut it.
Yes this objection is too commonly misunderstood so no worries here as many if not all libertarians do not at first grasp its significance. Also, the grounding objection attacks the truth-value of Counterfactuals (CFs) of freedom. In other words, CFs of freedom, which are associated with the libertarian notion that S can self-determine or self-originate either x or ~x, have no truth-value because no one, especially God, has knowledge of them. Once more, the grounding objection argues for no truthfulness concerning CFs. Therefore, the libertarian must argue and prove that CFs have truth-value in order to refute the grounding objection. Take notice that this can be quite easily applied to your farmer illustration as well notions of “unintended circumstances” and then the truthfulness concerning what the farmer (who possesses libertarian freedom) would do.
I’ll leave you with some questions regarding the ontological nature of CFs that the libertarian needs to answer. (1) If CF conditionals are independent of God, then how do they relate to God’s will and activity? (2) Moreover, if CFs exist independent of God, then how does one account for their existence without undermining the very godness of God? And (3) if CFs are dependent on God, then how so, since CFs are neither caused by or determined by God?
ReplyDeleteA couple of thoughts quickly before I call it a night. More can be said later, but this will give you an idea of where I think this can go.
ReplyDeleteFirst, I think in part this comes down to a word game, as indicated by your term "self-determinism" in referring to agent causation. The idea you seem to want to push is that any sort of causation is itself "determinism." This is not what I, nor I think any other libertarian, would mean by "determinism." Determinism as I and other libertarians use the term refers to a system in which the totality of events are fixed- there is a determined "matter of fact," to use your terminology, concerning everything that will ever happen and this "matter of fact" has been determined for as long as facts have existed. This "systematic determinism" is what libertarians reject, not the notion of causation. An agent can be a cause and this not imply that determinism in this systematic form exists.
As for the counterfactuals bit, I'm not sure there needs to be a truth value to them. This is what molinism tries to accomplish, but I'm not convinced it works- from the standpoint of common sense, how can a hypothetical statement have a truth value? What I think does provide a bit of a solution to the problem, though, is the recognition that the term "counterfactual" refers to a hypothetical that did not come to pass- in other words, its to some degree and implied past tense. If we posit that the hypotheticals we are talking about refer to future events that have not actualized and that are genuinely possible, though, then I think we have a different situation entirely. We are no longer dealing with counterfactuals but with real possible futures which are then actualized by an agents actions. Not entirely certain where that takes us, but its creeping more and more in the direction of an open future model...
So, I'm taking a quick minute this morning to respond and look forward to a more formal response from you. First, I know how you are going to word "determinism" as well as what it refers to, but the word game is not what the discussion comes down to. What it comes down to is answering the grounding objection. I'll grant it to you that it's not the same type of determinism as it is for the compatibilist but it's a form of determinism (i.e. Self-determinism or agent causation) nonetheless. In other words, it's a form of determinism "in" C.
ReplyDeleteAs for your equation of CFs to future tense statements...well that's been done and refuted. For more check out what Craig had to say about it, then read Cowan's article for a rebuttal (I can give you specifics if you wish). In short, I'm not convinced.
The significance of the distinction in meanings about determinism is pretty important to me. If by "determinism" all you mean is some sort of causation, then of course I am a determinist. If by "determinism" we mean the systematic determinism I was describing, though, then I reject the hypothesis. In the response to the grounding objection I gave originally, the assumed definition I think is there between the lines is that of systematic determinism, not simply causation. This is why the "prior to" example was important- when we add that clause to the statement, it makes complete sense on a libertarian account. Prior to C, there is no fact of the matter about what S will do at C if there are alternative possibilities open to S at C. The absence of that kind of qualification and the assertion that without determinism there could never be a "fact of the matter" about what S will do at C assumes, I think, that by determinism we mean a systematic determinism in which the "fact of the matter" has always been and will always be. That eternally fixed fact of the matter, that systematic determinism, is what libertarianism denies, and if that is what we mean by determinism in the grounding objection then we have simply restated the libertarian thesis. If, however, you mean the more narrow definition of "causation" then I think most libertarians would argue that you have not proven your point. Why can the "fact of the matter" not come into being when the agent acts as a cause? Why does it need to be a "fact" prior to this? These seem to me to only be necessary conditions if we assume systematic determinism.
ReplyDeleteWhich ties into the answer I would give to the counterfactuals bit. I'm not sure why I have to argue that counter factuals have truth value to defend my thesis. Maybe Bill Craig thinks libertarians need that, but I don't buy most of Craig's theories, so probably not gonna buy this one. If the future is open, which I think (but am not 100% sold on yet) may be a consequence of there being alternative possibilities, then talk of truth values about things that haven't happened yet makes no sense whatsoever. It also doesn't make sense to call them "counter-factual" with the implication that there is a corresponding actual fact. That description only makes sense in retrospect. If they are genuinely alternative possibilities, then both options are strictly hypothetical until one is actualized. At which time it becomes a "fact of the matter."
Again, I'm not 100% sold on the open future response. However, its value for this discussion is that it illuminates further how the grounding objection is assuming the determinist definition and therefore shouldn't be a worry to libertarians, whether or not they actually hold to an open future model.
Does S and S alone determine x or ~x? If so, then is this not a form of determinism? It's called self-determinism or agent causation. I think if you admit this then the grounding objections falls into place quite nicely. It's pretty sweet!
ReplyDeleteIn your original post, the phrasing is "S is free to do x in C if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C." In that statement of the libertarian thesis, the meaning of determinism seems to be the kind of systematic determinism I have been discussing. In your most recent question, "Does S and S alone determine x or ~x?" we seem to be operating with a much more narrow meaning of "determine," namely, one that makes S a cause for either x or ~x. So long as we keep switching definitions, we will never arive at a consistent argument. Pick one and stick with it.
ReplyDeleteSorry man. To clarify. The latter one is a question directed at you so that you see how libertarians resort to a form of determinism as they attempt to respond to the former, which is still the premises of the argument. So no change or alternating going on here. Hope this clears things up.
ReplyDeleteOne more thing, the grounding objection falls into place because of the common critiques of agent causation or self-determinism proving the illegitimacy of this type of determinism.
ReplyDeleteDon't have time to give a full response, but perhaps you should discuss some of the critiques of agent causation. I'm still not convinced we aren't wrangling over definitions, but we can take up that debate more later if you want.
ReplyDeleteOk, looks like I got back to this first. I'm going to push my response to the grounding objection one more time by doing a step by step analysis of the argument you have presented and maybe this will illustrate the definitional issue that I am hinting at:
ReplyDelete[First the Libertarian Assumption: Given any set of C, S is free to do x in C if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C.]
By determinism in this statement I think any libertarian would mean what we have above termed "systematic determinism." We could possibly state that this way, to keep with the flow of our argument: systematic determinism entails that at any time A, what S would do at any other time B (or C or D or whatever) is a "matter of fact" and that at no time could that "matter of fact" be different. In other words, this matter of fact is eternally fixed or static. This systematic determinism is what libertarians deny.
[Next the Grounding Objection: If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C.]
This is only true if by "fact of the matter" we mean the same thing as was meant in the definition of "systematic determinism" stated above. In other words, an eternally fixed "fact" that is always the same no matter what temporal perspective we are approaching it from. If that kind of "eternally fixed fact" is what you intend to mean by "fact of the matter" then yes, libertarianism entails that there would be no such fact. If we mean something different by "fact of the matter"- if these facts are not eternally fixed, then the argument does not follow. In other words, if these facts can "come into being" at time C when agent S acts, then the grounding objection is not actually entailed by determinism. To repeat that, this objection is only entailed by determinism if "fact of the matter" refers to a systematically determined eternally fixed fact. Any other meaning and it does not work because no other meaning of "determinism" is denied by libertarians.
[Therefore: If there is no fact of the matter, or truthfulness, concerning what S would do in C, if S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then it does not exist.]
ReplyDeleteTwo logical problems with this conclusion. The first is the sudden appearance of the phrase "or truthfulness." I have interpreted that to further bolster my interpretation of "fact of the matter" as a kind of static, eternally unchanging fact (truth is usually taken to be static), but it does kinda randomly pop up here. The second logical problem is that it is a bit unclear what "it" refers to in the consequence of this "if-then" statement. Does it refer to "fact of the matter"? I think that is what you intend. If that is the case, the conclusion here is just a restatement of the original premise that there is no fact of the matter (and hence, rather obviously, the fact of the matter does not exist). So again, if we mean by "fact of the matter" a static, eternally fixed, systematically determined fact, then this conclusion follows and the objection is really just a restatement of the libertarian denial of systematic determinism and not seriously consequential for a libertarian in other regards. If we mean by "fact of the matter" anything else, then the argument does not follow from the libertarian assumption because we have changed definitions. See what I'm getting at?
[To explain the last part a little more: it does not exist because no knows or there is no truthfulness or fact in the matter.]
This is where I started- if existence here is contingent on someone knowing, then we could perhaps amend the grounding objection by adding the "prior to C" clause, which then leads us toward the "open future" option. I don't think that a libertarian has to go here, but I think by linking the existence of a "fact of the matter" with knowledge you have made that an option for revising the grounding objection to draw out a possible implication of the libertarian denial of systematic determinism.
So what I'm getting at here is that the attempt to argue that "agent causation" is a kind of determinism ruled out by the grounding objection is fallacious because agent causation rests on a different definition of "determinism," to use your word, than that of systematic determinism and the "eternally fixed fact" idea we have shown the grounding objection to be depending on above. The grounding objection then becomes little more than a restatement of the libertarian's denial of systematic determinism with several options remaining to explain causation which are not themselves dependent on systematic determinism. The Aristotle account I have given is, I think, one such possible account of explaining how agent causation and alternative possibilities might arise which (a) does not deny causation and (b) does deny systematic determinism.
ReplyDeleteDoes the distinction I'm drawing make sense? Its pretty important, and if it doesn't then this is not going to go anywhere.
Well, this has taken me some time to put together. Between working on campus, reading 900 pages before my summer class starts in the beginning of June, planning and organizing youth stuff this weekend, preparing to speak at my church on Sunday evening, doing an appropriate amount of blogging, and hanging out with Andrea and friends my week has been pretty crazy. Anyway, my fear is that some of this might be getting off track, but let me state up front that the main point in all of this is to use the elements of your original post and find out which system of freedom works best.
ReplyDeleteNow your most recent response is in many ways is a retooling of our conversation, and that was a sweet idea. So first of all, thank you for focusing on the elements of the grounding objection. That should hopefully aid in avoiding misunderstandings. So let me begin by drawing our attention to the farmer illustration, unintended circumstances, and self-forming moments by quoting portions of you at length. Also, I think by doing this we can all stay better on track and thus avoid unnecessary discussion.
“The farmer plowing their field comes across a chest buried there long ago. The chest is not there "randomly"- it was intentionally hidden there. Nor is the farmer there "randomly"- he intended to be plowing his field. But neither the person who hid the chest nor the farmer intended for this discovery to happen, these two paths have crossed in a way that was unexpected, creating an "unintended circumstance."
This brings us right into a discussion of how best to understand what the farmer would freely do in this circumstance, and that is precisely the direction that you take us. Well done!
“The model of free will I have found most compelling is one that I think can be greatly aided by both these concepts. This model [of freedom]…argues that not every decision must be "free" in the sense of having "alternative possibilities." Instead, freedom refers to our ability to shape ourselves, to oversee the formation of our character and beliefs. This requires that at crucial junctures in our life, what Kane calls "Self-Forming Moments," we have the ability to choose which way we will go.”
So far nothing problematic other than your reference to Kane ;) Also, your reference to these self-forming moments, within an unintended circumstance or not, is non-problematic if you’re not assuming libertarian freedom (I’ll explain more in a bit.).
“These moments arise from the kinds of "unintended circumstances" that we encounter throughout life. In these moments where the chain of action we have taken part in leaves us entirely unprepared for the circumstance we find ourselves in, a decision must be made which will set the course of a new chain of action. That decision is not necessitated by any of the previous actions that brought us to this place- it is a "new" moment, as it were. Thus, we must deliberate and determine what principles will guide us through that moment. It is in exactly these sorts of circumstances that our character is "formed" into the kind of person we are.”
ReplyDeleteAgain, nothing too problematic here unless one assumes libertarian freedom, so let me begin with a possible libertarian assumption (LA).
LA: Given any set of Circumstances (C), the agent (S) is free to do the action (x) in C if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C.
First, what type of determinism is referred to here? Well, the libertarian would reject a type of determinism that I’ll label as divine omnicausality. You have labeled systematic determinism, but from now on let’s refer to it as divine omnicausality. The type of determinism that the libertarian would accept has been called self-determinism or agent causation, which gets worked out in many of your statements above. The clearest example would be that one “must deliberate and determine what principles will guide us through that moment. It is in exactly these sorts of circumstances that our character is "formed" into the kind of person we are.” Once more so we’re clear, the LA is more specifically about S not being free to do x in C if S is systematically determined to do either x or ~x.
Now why would the libertarian reject divine omnicausality? Well because they believe that such determinism undermines the genuineness of human freedom, is inconsistent with moral responsible agents and commends a vision of God that they find revolting. Now I’m not saying that this is true for every libertarian across the spectrum, but they are at least the most common believes and reason for rejection. However, the compatibilist has responded to the first one, the randomness charge turns the table on libertarianism and moral responsibility (see our other conversation for more on this), and the last is simply an absurd caricature.
The LA is problematic because of what the grounding objection (GO) asserts.
ReplyDeleteGO: If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C.
So if S is not divinely omnicaused to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C. Now in your most recent comment you made a statement regarding the meaning of “fact of the matter.” Since I am not the original author, I can only interpret its meaning. Therefore, it seems that “fact of the matter” refers to truthfulness or fact concerning what S would actually do. You then mentioned that truthfulness or fact concerning S doing either x or ~x could “come into being.” That seems like a fine redefinition or understanding but it also begs the question concerning its legitimacy. In other words, can S originate or bring into being either x or ~x? It’s my contention, following many notable scholars, that self-determinism is seriously flawed, and I’ll begin discussion by demonstrating how divine omnicausality is the only type of determinism that can provide humanity with the fact of the matter concerning what free creatures would do.
Now as you have also noted, the GO assumes what I’ve labeled divine omnicausality. But this type of determinism has many supporting factures. One, it goes along quite well with certain Scriptural teachings concerning God’s relationship to all things that are held together in him (Col 1:17), and also have their being in him (Acts 17:28). Yes there are also numerous Scriptural teachings that support human freedom, but how are we to understand that human freedom? (On a side note, the libertarian sometimes loads those passage in their canon and shouts them off one by one displaying assumptions that their view to hold true in them, but what a logical fallacy that is!) So in light of these two truths in Scripture, it seems that the compatibilist is truer to the Word as they have seriously taken into account both and lands on the side of God determining all things. The libertarians have also taken a position and as a result marginalizes the work of God (see my first blog post for more on this). If anything I’d rather marginalize man’s work than God’s.
Next, divine ominicausality is supported by the basic principles of causality (i.e. Every effect has a cause. Every contingent being is caused by another. Every limited being is caused by another. Every thing that comes into being is caused by another. Nonbeing cannot cause being.). Pair this with our theological/biblical notion of God being the primary cause of everything (also the notion of creation ex nihilo), how can one reconcile the primary cause- namely God and the contingency and liberty of the second causes- namely the will of man? The answer is that this demonstrates that creaturely dependence works simultaneously with the primary cause and this cannot be sufficiently explained by those who are contingent or secondary causes (as the libertarian seeks to do concerning human will and freedom) because they can never truly account for the secondary cause. The reason they cannot truly account for the secondary cause is because one could still ask who or what caused it? Therefore, the type of determinism is the only type that can give reasons why as a result of divine cause and effect concerning what we as free creatures do.
Now in some of our past discussions I set before us what I (following Cowan’s lead) labeled indirect determinism and I’ll outline it once more. In light of the truths we find in Scripture and in order to account for them, it is possible that God determines S's actions in some way that does not undermine their freedom. That is, we might say that God, when he created S, gave S certain desires and inclinations, together with an intellect that could deliberate on what actions to take to reach some desired end. In this more indirect way, God can then determine S's actions without directly intervening in S's life, and without undermining his freedom. S's actions would issue from his own practical reason. They would be the result of his own deliberations as to what he should do to attain the goals he desires to attain. And God would be in control because the goals, desires, and character of S, along with the reasons available to S, would have been given to him by God. This is the indirect way in which God exercises control in the actual sequence of S.
ReplyDeleteNow a brief and basic critic of agent causation, which I alluded to in a paragraph above. Remember the LA: Given any set of C, S is free to do x in C if and only if S is not (divinely omnicaused) determined to do either x or ~x in C. In other words, S would only be free if S self-determined either x or ~x. As I’ve alluded to this begs the question of agent causation. So once more here’s a basic critique of agent causation. What caused the agent causation? If you don’t have an unmoved mover type of causation, then you enter into an infinite regression of causes resulting in you not being able to meaningfully discuss reasons why you do want you do. This is why “fact of the matter” concerning what the farmer would do cannot “come into being” as you suggested earlier.
Now the libertarian might argue that it is a philosophical answer that provides such reasoning. Namely, it is logically possible for God to create contingent beings that have the ability to act independently of his all-determining will. Sure it’s possible but this philosophical answer begs a theological/biblical question: Did he? It seems that Scriptural teachings of divine ominicausality and human freedom imply that they are compatible. In other words, God causes all secondary cause (especially the human will) while simultaneously leaving the liberty or freedom of the will unimpaired. The mechanics of this possibility cannot in this life be clearly and perfectly explained but it does a much better job than libertarianism.
So this brings me to a conclusion, which I have retooled. Following what the GO states:
If there is no fact of the matter to what S would do in C, then S’s action is unknowable.
Allow me to example this a bit. If S is not divinely omnicaused to do either x or ~x, and there can be no fact of the matter to what S would do in C, then we have no way of knowing what S would do. Apply this to your farmer illustration. If we assume libertarian freedom, then we would never we able to know how the farmer would respond in this unintended circumstance. Moreover, your statement regarding “self-forming moments” implies that we can know what the farmer would do, but not according to the GO.
ReplyDeleteThe LA and GO together naturally introduce us to a critique of the truth-value of Counterfactuals (CFs) of freedom. In other words, CFs of freedom are commonly associated with the libertarian notion that S can self-determine or self-originate either x or ~x, because one cannot have libertarian freedom without the freedom of indifference. Also, according to the GO CFs have no truth-value because no one, especially God, has knowledge of them. Therefore, the libertarian must argue and prove that CFs have truth-value in order to refute the grounding objection. Apply this once more to your farmer illustration. If the farmer is confronted with this “unintended circumstance” and the fact of the matter concerning what the farmer (who possesses libertarian freedom) in this circumstance would do is unknown because it does not exist. In other words, you would need fixed determinism to provide you with an answer.
Once more, I’ll provide you with some questions regarding the ontological nature of CFs that the libertarian needs to answer. (1) If CF conditionals are independent of God, then how do they relate to God’s will and activity? (2) Moreover, if CFs exist independent of God, then how does one account for their existence without undermining the very godness of God? And (3) if CFs are dependent on God, then how so, since CFs are neither caused by or determined by God?
Completely understand being busy and having a hard time getting back to this. Have been traveling lately, which complicates managing a blog. At the moment I’m in Tahoe with family for the memorial of my grandfather. So like you, getting back to this as I can.
ReplyDeleteGlad we are on the same page with the LA denying only systematic determinism. Divine omnicausality would be a type of systematic determinism- the LA rejects both this and any “naturalistic” version of systematic determinism. While you acknowledged a distinction in types of causality initially in your most recent responses, it almost seems to me that you forget this when discussing causality later, in particular in relation to the “basic principles of causality.” Yes, divine omnicausality could be said to be consistent with general principles of causation. But so can agent causality.
In a couple of places you make the accusation that libertarians are begging the question. The first has to do with the meaning of “fact of the matter.” The problem is that this definition is not an argument but a definition. How we define this term will be contingent on the theory we are working with. That is not begging the question because we are not making an argument.
The second place is near the end of your discussion and has to do with agent causation in relation to the LA. The problem with this accusation is that the LA is not an argument either but a definition which lays out what the libertarian thesis would entail (incidentally, I’m not sure I like the label “assumption,” but I’m using it just because its been used in this conversation. I would rather describe it as a thesis). Part of that is either agent causation or a similar theory of causation in the place of systematic determinism. We can then make arguments for this thesis and its implications, but the thesis itself does not “beg the question.”
One other note about logical form in this discussion. Proof texting happens on both sides, so let’s not devolve into finger pointing.
Now to the main substance of your response:
ReplyDeleteIn response to the primary/secondary causation bit (and your comment about the unmoved mover), look for a post soon on Aristotle’s theories of causation. But the brief version is this- your account stems from the Kalaam cosmological argument which assumes chains of causation that are temporal in sequence. Aristotle’s original cosmological argument is not temporal but ontological. I think its perfectly legitimate to argue that there is an ontological chain of causation stemming from a “first cause” which explains the existence of all things, but this does not necessarily translate into a temporal succession of causes that would imply a kind of “systematic determinism.”
Finally, your retooled conclusion goes right back to where we started. Why is it unknowable? Because for it to be knowable, it would need to be “static” which is another way of saying “systematically determined.” So again, the GO only restates the LA by concluding that the LA entails a denial of systematic determinism. I’m not sure why my statement about SFO’s implies that we could “know” what the farmer would do. I think it implies exactly the opposite- that none of the previous chains of causation can be said to determine what will happen in this “unintended circumstance,” a consequence of which is that it is unknown. At least until the agent acts, and then we have a known “fact of the matter.” But this is only in retrospect, not in prospect. What this implies, I think, is that we don’t have to say anything about the truth value of “counter-factuals,” partly because there are no “facts” prior to the moment of self-determination and partly because the term “counter-factual” implies a retrospective view. What I think you seem to want to claim is that if we can’t predict an action, or if can’t be known in advance, it can’t happen. But that seems to me clearly false. Whether or not we know the “truth-value” of a “counter-factual” in advance of a moment of agent causation does not seem to in any way reduce the ability of the agent to act in that moment. It just points to an epistemological limitation on our part.